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ent notions of legitimacy and democracy in order to identify which aspects of democratic legitimacy of global economic governance can be addressed through transnational parliamentarization. It is argued that national parliaments must react to the emergence of global economic governance in a multi-level system through new forms of transnational parliamentarization. In its empirical part, the paper assesses the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO (PCWTO) and the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) as two examples of such transnational parliamentarization. Drawing on the theory of deliberative democracy the paper argues that the contribution of these settings to democratic global governance should not be measured on the basis of their formal decision-making power but with regard to their role as fora for transnational discourses and on their potential to empower national parliamentarians. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate about the legitimacy deficit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and of other international economic institutions forms a core element of the legal and political discourse about global economic governance. 
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-2 -mentary assemblies in various regional settings and the emergence of less formal parliamentary dimensions of global economic governance.
The third and fourth sections of the paper discuss the Parliamentary Conference on the WTO (PCWTO) and the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) respectively as two recent examples of transnational parliamentarization. It is argued that the contribution of these settings to the democratization of global governance should not be measured on the basis of their formal decision-making power but on the basis of their contribution to the empowerment of national parliamentarians to engage in substantive deliberations and discourses on the key issues which are at stake in organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank or the IMF. Based on this, the paper turns to the question of how the current system can be improved in its final section. It is suggested that the two parliamentary settings engage in more controversial (parliamentary-style) debates on pertinent issues, publicize their deliberations, broaden the topics of their debates beyond the core issues of the institutions they are associated with, strengthen their institutional basis and establish links between each other.
II. A FRAMEWORK OF DEBATE: THE NEED FOR AND THE LACK OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
A key challenge for anyone approaching the debates on the democratic legitimacy of international law or international institutions are the variations in terminology.
2
The core concepts of that debate, legitimacy and democracy, are used in very different ways. In order to engage in a fruitful exchange of ideas it is therefore essential to clarify the meaning of these terms. This section distinguishes different notions of the two concepts and relates them to each other. This will then allow me to identify more precisely the place of transnational parliamentarization in the legitimacy/democracy debate.
Legitimacy
The starting point of the analysis should be the notion of legitimacy, because it has the broader meaning and encompasses democratic legitimacy as well as other forms of legitimacy. It is generally agreed that a positive (or sociological) and a normative approach towards legitimacy can be distinguished. 
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a) Positive and normative legitimacy
Positive legitimacy addresses the question whether a norm of international law or a decision of an international organisation is accepted as legitimate by the international legal community.
4
This encompasses actual compliance with the norm or decision, but also relates to the perception of the norm from the perspective of those who have to comply with it. Positive legitimacy concerns itself with the behaviour of nations and the reasons why they comply (or do not comply) with a particular norm of international law or a decision of an international tribunal.
5
For example, empirical studies have shown that the compliance rate of WTO dispute settlement decisions is higher than the observance of decisions under the GATT 1947 regime.
6
It can therefore be argued that the positive legitimacy of the WTO is higher than that of its predecessor. Contrary to this, the proliferation of regional and bilateral free trade agreements increased exponentially under the WTO regime 7 , which could be seen as an indication that states increasingly "opt out" of the multilateral trading system suggesting a reduction in the positive legitimacy of the WTO. Positive legitimacy can only be determined on the basis of those who are actually bound by a particular regime, i.e. the subjects of that regime. Violent protests at WTO meetings are therefore not an indication of a lack of positive legitimacy, because individuals are not subject to WTO law. However, the protests can be seen as a sign of a deficit of the normative legitimacy of the WTO.
Normative legitimacy refers to the principles and values which justify the existence of a particular norm or a legal regime. Normative legitimacy does not address whether a norm is accepted, but whether it should be accepted or, more generally, whether it is acceptable. Normative legitimacy requires that a rule or decision meets certain generally accepted standards of justice, fairness, or reasonableness derived from substantive values which are generally assumed to be of a higher rank. In other words, normative legitimacy refers to the principles upon which the justification of a norm is base. 
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14 However, if one applies other and more advanced models of input legitimacy, questions arise. As will be discussed in the next section, the institutions of global economic governance can be questioned in particular on the basis of democratic legitimacy.
Aspects of output legitimacy concern the effectiveness of the rule or organisation to achieve its goals and to contribute to the achievement of specific policy objectives. On a general level output legitimacy can be measured in terms of the capacity of an organisation or legal regime to solve pertinent problems.
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More specifically output legitimacy could be seen to aim at production of global public goods such as international peace, , a number of other aspects will have to be considered.
Elements of input and output legitimacy can coexist and often supplement each other.
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In particular, notions of fairness and justice involve both elements of input and output legitimacy. The different dimensions and elements of legitimacy which can be associated with the international trading system are illustrated in Figure 1 . It should be noted that the different elements of input and output legitimacy depicted in this figure are not meant to be exhaustive nor should they be considered as clearly distinguishable.
For example, there are certainly overlaps between aspects of transparency and democratic legitimacy or between distributive justice and sustainable development. 
Democracy
While the two notions of legitimacy (empirical and sociological) and the two dimensions of the sources of normative legitimacy (input and output) seem to be relatively uncontroversial, the term and the idea of democracy remains much more contested. Instead I will try to sketch the general strands of the debate.
At the outset it should be noted that one approach to the notion of democracy in the context of global economic governance does not fit with the model developed here. This approach uses democracy in a very broad manner including elements of political decision-making and of redistributive justice.
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It is argued that a regime which increases the As pointed out above, the traditional approach towards input legitimacy of international law merely requires the consent of the states and does not consider the democratic legitimacy of international institutions to be necessary. However, the majority of commentators do not seem to share this view, though. The predominant view seems to be that international organisations can and must be legitimised from a democratic perspective and that this requires reforms of the current system of global governance.
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Nevertheless, there are considerable differences between the notions of democracy.
a) The "subjects" of democratic decision-making: States, NGOs or citizens?
At the risk of oversimplifying matters, it is suggested that three general approaches towards the term democracy can be distinguished as a first layer of differentiation. These approaches employ different notions of who are the participants or the "subjects" of a democratic decision process. The third and most common use of the term democracy relates the concept to the idea of self-governance of members of a certain political body (citizen-based approach).
Democratic legitimacy is construed from the perspective of individuals. It depends on the possibility of those affected by a regulation to consent to the regulation.
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According to this understanding the basis of the democratic legitimacy of institutions such as the WTO or international financial institutions is the will of the people. The remainder of this paper is based on this approach of democratic legitimacy.
b) National, cosmopolitan and deliberative democracy
Two broad schools of thought which both adhere to the citizen-based notion of democracy can be distinguished. A traditional school of thought restricts the use of the term democracy to a political system established at the nation state. At least implicitly, this approach is based on the assumption that democracy requires a "demos", a pre-defined group of people, which governs itself and which is presumed to exist only at the nation state level. ', Northw. JILB 17 (1996 /1997 pends on the level of these two elements and on the extent to which the will of the people is reflected in the acts of an international organisation or an international agreement.
Some authors following the national understanding of democracy go even further than this. According to their view democracy is a concept which is confined to national law and domestic institutions. Hence, international law and international organisations cannot and should not be measured on the basis of democratic legitimacy.
37
However, they can restrict democratic governance of the nation state. In fact, it is often argued from this perspective that organisations such as the WTO limit democratic decisionmaking and are therefore "undemocratic".
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The remedy suggested by these authors is a restriction of the power of international settings and the ability of the nation state to always leave the organisation.
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The classical approach of national democracy can be contrasted with a cosmopolitan understanding of democracy. Cosmopolitan democracy does not restrict the notion of democracy to the self-government of national demos. Instead, this approach assumes that democratic decision-making can transcend national borders and can also be exercised in transnational constellations. However, cosmopolitan democracy requires forms and methods different from those at the national level.
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Cosmopolitan democracy refers to a system of governance comprising democratic nation states and democratic elements at the regional and international level, including inter alia parliamentary assemblies for international organizations, the participation of NGOs or transnational referenda.
Both approaches put an emphasis on formal rules of representation and decisionmaking. Many authors, in particular in the social sciences, argue that these forms must be supplemented by elements of deliberative democracy.
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Based on the theory of communicative action and rational discourse deliberative democracy refers to decision mak- ing process based on the exchange of arguments (arguing). Deliberative decisionmaking is contrasted with decision-making based on the exchange of commitments aiming at a compromise that benefits all (bargaining). The differentiation between arguing and bargaining and its implication for the democratic legitimacy of a decision-making process is particularly relevant for international organizations, which often include both forms of decision-making. Advocates of deliberative democracy at the international level highlight the institutional requirements for deliberation in an international organization, such as transparency and inclusiveness of the process, and the requirement to state the reason for a decision. This is where democratic legitimacy and other forms of input legitimacy meet and reinforce each other.
It is submitted that the three approaches should not be seen as alternative but as core elements of a substantive idea of democracy in a multi-level system. In this system, the requirements of the traditional model are the necessary basis: Without formal consent of domestic parliaments and the responsibility of diplomats and negotiators there is no formal link between decisions at the global level and the articulation of the will of the people at the domestic level. However, this is not sufficient. Without the additional elements of the cosmopolitan and the deliberate notions of democracy the link remains formal and thin. Transparency, debate and deliberation and a process of public deliberation are necessary to ensure the emergence and articulation of a "will of the people".
The democratic deficit of the WTO
Based on such a combined approach it seems possible to identify three elements of a democratic legitimacy gap of decision-making in the WTO.
a) Three elements of the democratic deficit (and one argument against it)
The first concerns the accountability of the relevant actors at the WTO. This relates primarily to the representatives of the WTO Members and to a lesser degree the WTO officials. These individual decision-makers have to be held accountable to the articulated will of the peoples of the WTO Members. As mentioned above, the vehicle of this accountability is the legitimacy chain. However, in international organizations, in particular in the WTO and in the international financial institutions the chain becomes so long that it is questionable whether the actors are de facto still accountable to a domestic constituency. Lori Wallach of the US Non-governmental organization Public Citizen put it this way: "Between someone who actually got elected and the DG of the WTO there are so many miles that he is accountable to no one". It is well known that many national parliaments were not able or not willing to invest much time in the study and discussion of the Uruguay Round Agreements before they agreed to the package of treaties. Thirdly, decision-making at the WTO often does not meet the criterion of a rational discourse and deliberation defined as a process of exchanging arguments in order to convince each other. While the decision-making process in the committees and councils of the WTO regarding technical and organisational matters meets these standards to a certain degree, the decision-making process in multilateral trade negotiations is usually based on bargaining instead of arguing.
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Negotiators do not reach solutions and compromises by trying to convince each other on what is the best solution by rational arguments. Rather a negotiator must have enough concessions to offer in some areas without granting too many concessions in key areas in order to receive concessions from her or his negotiating partners. WTO negotiators seek "package deals", which combine different interests, but do not integrate them into a common framework. The principle of "do ut des" is a principle of contract-making but not of deliberation and rational discourse.
Many commentators seem to share the view that these three elements of the democratic deficit in WTO decision-making are problematic. They differ regarding the sever- ity of the problem. While some authors only concede that decision-making and the institutional framework of the WTO could be improved regarding these issues, others consider the WTO to be a more or less illegitimate organisation. I would position myself somewhere in the middle of the two extremes agreeing with the critics that the problems are severe and seriously undermine the legitimacy basis of the WTO. However, I am also of the opinion that decision-making in the WTO will never match the level of democratic decision-making that is possible (and necessary) at the national level. Hence, it
should not be measured on that basis alone.
It should be noted that the relationship between democratic legitimacy and international global governance does not have to be a conflicting one. Using an argument
Christian Joerges developed in the context of EU law, the debate on the democracy deficit of global economic governance can be framed in a different way by focussing on the democracy deficit of the nation states. As Joerges writes "The legitimacy of governance within constitutional states is flawed in so far as it remains inevitably one-sided and parochial or selfish. The taming of the nation-state through democratic constitutions has its limits. [If and, indeed, because] democracies presuppose and represent collective identities, they have very few mechanisms to ensure that 'foreign' identities and their interests are taken into account within their decision-making processes".
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The democratic deficit results from the impact of unilateral policies of one nation on the people living in another country. Since the government of the first country cannot be held accountable by the electorate of the second country, the decision of the first country lacks legitimacy from the perspective of the second. In this light, international institutions and rules which discipline the use of unilateral measures and which provide a forum for the two countries to resolve the issues contribute to the democratisation of trade policy.
This "democratising" effect of the WTO and of other international disciplines cannot be denied. Nevertheless,it does not solve the problem that decisions taken at the global level pose a democratic legitimacy challenge vis-a-vis domestic policies. Hence, the conflict of laws approach developed by Joerges also calls for further democratisation of transnational decision making processes. In order to achieve this, he proposes a threedimensional system which includes innovative and new forms of cooperation between administrations and other experts. It is submitted that the cooperation of parliamentarians in the two networks discussed further in sections III and IV could be characterised as an element of this three-dimensional system. cretion for a national government. They therefore cut deeply into national legal and regulatory autonomy. The combination of these two factors creates the legitimacy deficit: On the one hand, the decisions of the international organization must be accepted even if they contradict national laws or policies. On the other hand, the content of these decisions has a profound effect on the national regulatory system. Due to the similarity of these effects, decisions that exercise a high compliance pull and affect domestic regulatory issues can be seen as "functionally equivalent" to supranational decisions.
50
III. LEGITIMIZATION THROUGH PARLIAMENTARIZATION
If one agrees that the three elements of the democratic deficit of the WTO are problem- 
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-15 -may be an option. A number of proposals which address the problems just mentioned have been discussed in the literature. As far as they involve the development of parliamentary settings or institutions beyond the nation state they can be referred to as elements of "transnational parliamentarization".
Domestic strategies
As mentioned above, the traditional representative model of democracy emphasises the impact of national parliaments on trade policy. Efforts to increase the legitimacy of the WTO would therefore aim to improve the instruments through which parliament influences trade policy. However, both the legitimacy chain and the parliamentary consent are instruments which are structurally weak. The remedies they provide (a vote of no confidence against a minister or the government and the refusal to ratify and international agreements) are only ultima ratio possibilities. Parliaments must therefore try to overcome the structural weakness of these instruments by exercising more control and providing more input during the negotiations. This could include greater scrutiny of the governments' activities in this field and possibly guidelines for trade negotiations.
These procedural instruments should be backed by informed and well-reasoned parliamentary opinion. To achieve this, national parliaments could engage in meaningful and substantive debates on trade policy issues. Even if the result of such a debate would only be a recommendation to the government or a report on a specific issue, it might still influence the position of the government, in particular if they are combined with a credible threat to reject the ratification of an agreement if the opinion of parliament was not taken into account.
A popular counter-argument against the increased parliamentarization of trade policy points out that governments -in democratic states at least -are themselves sufficiently legitimised from a democratic perspective to negotiate and agree upon international agreements. This argument is flawed, because it reduces the question of democratic legitimacy to the question whether the person taking the decision received his or her authority on the basis of an election. If democracy would be reduced to this criterion there would be no need for parliaments at all. Even laws could then be passed by a democratically elected government.
Transnational parliamentarization
The second element of parliamentarizing global (economic) governance coincides with the cosmopolitan idea of democracy and seeks to add a "parliamentary dimension" to international law-making. The highest level of democratic legitimacy could be achieved through the establishment of an international or transnational parliament, which consists of democratically elected Members and which has substantial influence on the law- As an alternative to formal parliamentary assemblies, parliamentarians from different national parliaments can also form transnational networks on specific issues and topics.
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These networks can be established in some institutional forms or on an informal basis. Some of these networks are predominantly channels through which their members share information and exchange views without holding regular plenary meetings, such as the Parliamentary Network on Nuclear Disarmament (PNND)
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, a worldwide association of parliamentarians concerned about issues of nuclear weapons, or Global
Legislators for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), a high-level group of parliamentarians from the G8+5 countries which shadows the G8-process. 
IV. THE PARLIAMENTARY CONFERENCE ON THE WTO (PCWTO)
The Conference the PCWTO often meets at the same location and time.
Historical development and legal basis
As mentioned in the previous section, the idea of a parliamentary dimension to the organisations. The legal character of that agreement is difficult to determine. Since the IPU is an international organisation (see Art. 1 of its Statutes) and has signed a host state agreement with Switzerland, it is partially a subject of international law. However, the EP is not. Yet, since the EC -of which the EP is an organ -is a subject of international law, the agreement to establish the PCWTO can be considered as part of international law. Nevertheless, this does not make the PCWTO an international organisation subject to international law.
In addition to the agreement between the two sponsoring institutions, the PCWTO has adopted Rules of Procedure which can be seen as an equivalent of a constituting charter. The most recent version of these Rules of Procedure dates from 2008. 
Objectives and functions
The objectives of the PCWTO are stated in Art. 1of its Rules of Procedure. The and the dissemination of these debates into the national parliaments. Thirdly, the PCWTO claims that it also wants to "oversee" WTO activities and influence the WTO in order to promote fairness, effectiveness and transparency. This is the most demanding objective, but it is questionable whether the PCWTO can live up to this claim.
The PCWTO constituted itself as an institution which generally supports the aims and objectives of the WTO. In fact, Art. 1.2 of the Rules of Procedure explicitly states that the PCWTO "seeks to promote free and fair trade that benefits people everywhere".
It should not be surprising that an institution which associates itself with the WTO generally supports the goals of that organisation. However, this objective should not be interpreted in such a way that national parliaments cannot send delegates which are fundamentally critical or even openly opposed to the WTO and trade liberalisation in general. It would undermine the representative basis of the PCWTO if its policy goals could be used to exclude certain parliamentarians based on their political views and would defeat the very purpose of the PCWTO.
Structure and decision-making
According to Art. 
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While a change in the composition of the parliamentarians increases the number of members of a national parliament to be exposed to trade issues it also makes a real discourse on trade issues more difficult.
It is noteworthy, that a number of delegations to the PCWTO also included members of the diplomatic mission of the country (Benin, China, Egypt, Guinea, India, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Mauritius, Nigeria, Russia, Turkey, United Kingdom, Yemen, and Zambia). This practice is questionable because it may undermine the institutional separation of parliaments from government which is a prerequisite for independent control of the government by parliament as part of a system of "checks and balances". The practice is also remarkable since governments are accepted as observers to the PCWTO and most governments which participated as observers sent delegates from their mis- It is interesting to note that participants and observers have the same speaking rights in the plenary sessions of the PCWTO (Art. 6.1 of the Rules of Procedure). No priority is given to parliamentarians. However, only participants have the right to adopt the final declaration (Art. 6.3. of the Rules of Procedure). The final declaration is adopted by consensus. There are no formal votes since there is no formal selection mechanism for the delegates and the number of the delegations is also not fixed.
Content of meetings and outcome
The sessions of the PCWTO usually last two days and involve with the exception of the meetings of the Steering Committee only plenary meetings. Apart from opening and closing ceremonies, the adoption of the agenda and the final declaration which is prepared by the Steering committee, there are three types of debates on substantive issues.
The first type concerns debates on -usually current -trade topics based on reports prepared by special rapporteurs from parliaments represented the PCWTO. There is no formal record of the debates at the PCWTO. For the 2008 session, the IPU and the EP produced a brochure which includes the speeches and presentations and excerpts from the debates.
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Assuming that these excerpts are representative, they show that most parliamentarians joining the debate share a genuine concern about the future of the world trading system and its impact on developmental, environmental and social issues. It should not be surprising that the level of knowledge of detailed trade issues is 
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At the end of each session a final declaration is adopted by consensus. The draft of this declaration is usually prepared by the Steering Committee. Apparently there is hardly any time to discuss this draft a great length. This may explain why the final decelerations are usually very broad and contain no specific political recommendations or demands. For example, the 2008 declaration contains general statements about the desirability of a conclusion of the Doha negotiations, the need to take the interests of developing countries into account and a self-imposed obligation to increase parliamentary scrutiny in trade matters.
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A more concrete outcome of the 2008 session of the PCWTO is a set of guidelines for relations between governments and parliaments on international trade issues.
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In this document the PCWTO stresses that quantity and quality of information to the parliament, the timing of the information exchange, and the opportunities of the parliament to use this information are key elements to increase the influence of a parliament on trade policy. Based on these three elements the PCWTO developed specific guidelines.
These include inter alia the production of information on trade issues as soon as it becomes available, the preparation of easily accessible material on draft trade agreements, 
The PCWTO's contribution to democratic legitimacy of the WTO
When assessing the PCWTO's contribution to democratic legitimacy, the uniqueness of the institution and the pragmatic approach of its organisers must be appreciated. The PCWTO also produced a tool which supports parliamentarians in their efforts to control the trade policy of their governments by suggesting guidelines regarding the relationship between parliamentarians and governments. In this respect, the PCWTO therefore supports a position which seems to be followed in particular in the US regarding the control of trade policy.
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In light of this, it is somewhat ironic that the US Senate is not represented in the PCWTO.
It is still unclear to which extent the PCWTO functions as a forum of deliberation. This can, however, be changed in the coming sessions of the PCWTO.
V. THE PARLIAMENTARY NETWORK ON THE WORLD BANK (PNOWB)
The Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) comprises parliamentarians from around the globe with a special interest in the policies of the World Bank and issues of development.
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The PNoWB meets once a year in plenary sessions to discuss issues which are on the agenda of the World Bank (and to lesser extend of the IMF) and to debate with senior Bank and Fund officials.
Historical development and legal basis
The Apart from its meetings at global and regional levels, which will be described in the next section, the PNoWB supports its Members through various information sharing channels, such as an e-mail newsletter or the production of information material. For example, the PNoWB and the World Bank have jointly developed a handbook to provide an overview of the Bank's governance structure, policies, evaluation and review mechanisms.
Structure and institutional setting
The main event of the PNoWB is its Annual Conference which seeks to engage parliamentarians in debates about issues on development and global governance and according to the PNoWB's own view "help strengthen the accountability and transparency of international financial institutions by providing a platform for dialogue". This statement in itself is interesting, because it seems to be based on the perception that accountability can be achieved through dialogue rather than through control and critique. The Annual 
Contribution of the PNoWB to transnational democratic legitimacy
Similar to the PCWTO, the PNoWB's main contribution to the enhancement of transnational parliamentarization consists of its ability to strengthen the deliberative capacity of its members through information facilitation, exchange of views and dialogue with representatives of the international financial institutions. To the extent that this empowers national parliaments to better scrutinise the policies of the World Bank and the contribution of their respective governments to the World Bank, it contributes to the reduction of the democratic legitimacy gap of global economic governance. However, it is not entirely clear whether the PNoWB functions as a forum for transnational deliberation and whether it can effectively exercise any control over the World Bank and its affiliations. In this respect it shares again characteristics with the PCWTO. The members of both bodies seem to focus more on information seeking when they meet with officials from the respective organisations.
The PNoWB is characterised by a greater degree of institutional stability and continuity than the PCWTO as its Membership does not depend on ad hoc decisions of a national parliament on whom to include as member of a delegation. Furthermore, the PNoWB also exists as an institution in the time between its Annual Conferences and continues to provide its Members different modes and platforms of exchange and deliberation. However, unlike the PCWTO, the PNoWB is not an institution of parliaments, but of parliamentarians. This has two implications: First, the mandate of the members of the PNoWB is only self-imposed. There is no limitation to the number of parliamentarians from one parliament joining the PNoWB. There are no mechanisms to ensure that members of the ruling party and the opposition are represented.
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Hence, these parliamentarians do not fully represent the population of their countries. Second, since the PNoWB members represent only themselves there is no obligation or expectation on them to report back to their parliaments and connect the transnational deliberations with a domestic discourse. This is, however, vital in order to enhance the contribution of the PNoWB to transnational democratic legitimacy.
VI. WHITHER FROM HERE? ELEMENTS TO IMPROVE AND INCREASE THE PARLIAMENTARIZATION OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
The preceding analyses of the PCWTO and the PNoWB and their contribution to transnational parliamentarization and hence to a reduction of the democratic deficit of global economic governance was only based on written material about and of these two set-tings which is publicly available. In order to fully assess the capacity of the PCWTO and the PNoWB to contribute to transnational democratic legitimacy, further research, in particular empirical studies would be necessary. Despite the limited character of the findings presented above, it seems possible to draw some preliminary conclusions and suggest some improvements of both bodies in order to strengthen their legitimizing function.
At the outset, it should be noted that both parliamentary settings differ substantially from a traditional parliamentary assembly of an international organisation and even more so from a directly-elected international parliament such as the European Parliament. The differences concern the legal basis, membership, and structure as well as the deliberative and control functions as summarised in Table 1 . These differences must be taken into account when assessing the potentials of the PCWTO and the PNoWB to contribute to democratic global economic governance. Given the structural differences between parliamentary assemblies or international parliaments on the one side and the PCWTO and the PNoWB on the other, the proposals for improvement suggested subsequently remain with the current institutional settings of these institutions and do not include proposals to transform them into another institution, such as a parliamentary assembly. As noted above, there is currently no political consensus for such a transformation and the objectives of improving democratic legiti-
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To start with, both bodies should make an effort to meet on a regular basis in order to ensure continuity of the debates and exchanges. The PNoWB has a better track-record in this respect than the PCWTO, which is partly due to the PCWTO's development out of meetings of parliamentarians at the occasion of WTO Ministerial Conferences which take place on an infrequent basis.
Perhaps even more important than regular meetings is the engagement in substantive debate and to create a room for deliberation. This could be facilitated by the production of reports on particular issues from different perspectives and controversial debates among the parliamentarians about these. Furthermore, both bodies should produce public records of the debates so that their debates can contribute to the wider discourse.
Both institutions would also benefit from establishing institutional relationships between each other. This seems particularly obvious in the case of the PNoWB's Committee on International Trade for Development.
Turning more specifically to the PCWTO, it would be an improvement if the institution would be transformed into a more permanent setting. 
